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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) and the order of the Utah
Supreme Court transferring this case to the Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the final judgment in a civil
case for the collection of money under a written contract.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was a prior judge's denial of Appellant's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of accord and satisfaction
binding on the trial judge as the law of the case?
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to make adequate

findings of fact to support the conclusion of law denying
Appellant's affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction?
3.

If there were adequate findings to support the

conclusion of law denying Appellant's affirmative defense of
accord and satisfaction, were the findings clearly contrary
to the weight of the evidence?
4.

Did

the

trial

court misapply

the

law to the

established facts relating to Appellant's affirmative defense
of accord and satisfaction?
5.
denying

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in
Appellant's

affirmative

defense

of

accord

and

satisfaction?
6.

Did the court err in allowing prejudgment interest

to be compounded?
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
There are no determinative constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case

This is a civil action for collection of money for
services rendered under a written contract.
2.

Course of the Proceedings

The complaint was filed August 8, 1985 praying for
damages of $30,162.50 (R. 2).

An Answer and Counterclaim1

was filed September 3, 1985 (R. 10).
Amended

Complaint

May

16,

1986

Plaintiff filed an

praying

for

damages

of

$21,549.50 (R. 24), to which an answer was filed June 2, 1986
(R. 31) .

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

July 31, 1986 (R. 45), which the Court (Judge Michael Murphy
presiding) denied

in a Summary Decision and Order filed

December 29, 1986 (R. 127). The case was tried to the Court
(Judge Timothy Hanson presiding) on January 12 and 13, 1988.
3.

Disposition in the Trial Court

On April 1, 1988, the trial court entered judgment for
Plaintiff/Respondent

for

$10,990.00,

plus

prejudgment

interest thereon, compounded annually from April 15, 1985 to
the date of judgment (R. 275), based on Findings of Fact and

1

The Counterclaim
stipulation.

was
-2-

settled

and

dismissed

by

Conclusions of Law (R. 270) entered concurrently with the
Judgment.
4.

Statement of Relevant Facts

In January, 1985, Plaintiff/Respondent Estate Landscape
and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. (hereinafter "Estate") and
Defendant/Appellant The Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Company (hereinafter "Mountain Bell") entered into a written
agreement
removal

wherein
services

Estate

agreed

for Mountain

to perform
Bell.2

certain snow

As part

of this

contract, Estate was obligated to remove snow at Mountain
Bell's central office in Alta, Utah "when the snow reaches
four inches."3

The contract provided: "The cost is to be

$85.00 per removal or $55.00 for the front end loader and
operator as required."4

The contract also required Estate to

submit monthly billings.5
Between December 28, 1984 and April 1, 1985, Estate
performed

snow

removal

services

at Mountain

Bell's Alta

office, but did not submit monthly billings as required by
the contract.6

At the close of the snow season, Estate sent

2

Exhibit 3, attached hereto as Appendix D.

3

Exhibit 3 (see Appendix D).

4

Exhibit 3 (see Appendix D).

5

Exhibit 3 (see Appendix D, at Art. V).

6

Transcript of Jan. 12 at 50-53; Smith Transcript of
Jan. 13 at 10; Response to Defendant's First Set of Requests
for Admission #3, R. 104.
Because there were several
reporters at various times during the trial, the transcript
is not paginated consecutively.
Therefore, it will be
referred to in this brief by date, and where necessary, by
-3-

Mountain

Bell

an

itemized

final

bill

for

$30,162.50,

representing services rendered at the Alta site during that
period.7

The billing included charges for the use of dump

trucks, although the contract contained no provision for
payment for such equipment.8
Mountain Bell's contract administrator was shocked at
the size of the bill, and therefore made inquiry to determine
whether the amount of snowfall at Alta warranted the charges
set forth on the bill.9

Relying upon daily snowfall data

supplied by the Alta Peruvian Lodge, Mountain Bell decided to
dispute the bill as being grossly excessive.10
As a means of resolving the billing dispute, Mountain
Bell decided not to pay the charges for days on which less
than

four

inches

of

snowfall was measured

by

the Alta

Peruvian Lodge, but only the balance of $8,613.00.l:L

After

consultation with legal counsel, Mountain Bell's contract
administrator therefore prepared a letter to Estate, dated
June 14, 1985,12 identifying those days on which the snowfall
the name of the reporter.
7

Exhibit 4, attached hereto as Appendix E.

8

Transcript of Jan. 12 at 49-50.

9

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 37-39.

10

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 38-41.

11

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 37-43.

12

Exhibit 6, attached hereto as Appendix F.
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at Alta was less than four inches, together with the charges
billed for those days.13

The letter concluded:

Based on the above identified billing descrepencies
[sic] we have enclosed a check for $8613.00 which
is payment in full for satisfaction of contracted
services. If you are not willing to accept that
sum, $8613.00 in full satisfaction of sums due, DO
NOT negotiate the check, for upon your negotiation
of that check, we will treat the matter as fully
paid.
(emphasis in original)
Mountain Bell's bill payment supervisor held the letter
pending delivery

of a check for $8,613.00

from Mountain

Bell's accounting department for enclosure with the letter.14
However, on or about June 21, 1985, rather than delivering
the check to the person holding the letter, Mountain Bell's
accounting department mailed the check directly to Estate.15
Upon

discovering

that

the

check

had

been

sent

separately, Mountain Bell's bill payment supervisor sent the
letter without enclosing a check, on about June 28, 1985.16
On about July 23, 1985, Estate's attorney wrote Mountain Bell
a letter acknowledging receipt of the check and demanding
payment of the balance.17

At the time Estate received the

13

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 42-44.

14

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45.

15

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 44-46.

16 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45; Smith Transcript
of Jan. 13 at 5.
17

Exhibit 14; Transcript of Jan. 12 at 8-9.
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letter (August 5, 1985) / 1 8 it had not negotiated the check.19
Estate knew that the check that it had received earlier from
Mountain Bell was the check referred to in the letter.20
Estate retained the $8,613.00 check until on or about October
28,

1985f

when

it

was

negotiated

and

deposited

for

collection.21
At trial, the court received undisputed evidence of the
foregoing

facts,

in

addition

to

receiving

conflicting

evidence concerning whether Estate had breached its contract
with Mountain Bell.

The court found that Estate had breached

the contract by failing to issue monthly billings to Mountain
Bell as required under the contract, but held the breach to
be immaterial.22

The court determined, however, that Estate

18

Transcript of Jan. 12 at 11-12. The letter was sent
by certified mail, which explains the delay between sending
(June 28, 1985) and receipt (Aug. 5, 1985). (R. 100)
19

Exhibit 8, attached hereto as Appendix G; Response to
Defendant's Second Set of Requests for Admissions #7, R. at 101.
20

Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests for
Admissions #8, R. at 101; Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 2425. Smith Transcript of Jan. 13 at 12.
21

Exhibit 8 (see Appendix G) ; Response to Defendant's
Second Set of Requests for Admissions #9, R. at 101. Three
days after it received the letter on Aug. 5, 1985, Estate
filed its complaint, praying for damages in the full amount
of the final bill, $30,162.50. (R. 2) Furthermore, Estate's
own accounting ledger never showed application of the
$8,613.00 check against the account. Exhibit 5; Transcript
of Jan. 12 at 41; Smith Transcript of Jan. 13 at 11-12. It
was only after the check was negotiated that Estate sought to
amend its complaint to recover the lesser amount of
$21,549.50 ($30,162.50 less $8,613.00). (R. 24-27)
22

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 6-7.
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was not entitled to bill for the use of dump trucks, because
the contract did not mention them.23
The court found that the contract provision regarding
payment

of

$85.00 per removal

"when the snow reaches 4

inches" was ambiguous, and construed the contract against
Mountain Bell, thus allowing Estate to recover for multiple
removals on a single day.24

The court also held that the

criterion for payment for a removal was not limited to inches
of

snowfall,

drifting.25

but

also

included

snow

accumulation

from

Finally, the court determined that removal of

each increment of four inches of snow constituted a "removal"
(e.g. removal of eight inches constituted two "removals").26
In denying Mountain Bell's affirmative defense of accord
and

satisfaction,

Judge Hanson

(the trial

judge) relied

heavily on Judge Murphy's Summary Decision denying Mountain
Bell's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, stating that he
considered that ruling to be the law of the case.27

No

finding of fact was made to support the denial of the accord
and satisfaction defense.
Based

on

the

(R. 270)

foregoing,

the

court

determined

that

Mountain Bell was liable under the contract for all amounts
23

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 12-14.

24

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 9-10.

25

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 11, 16.

26

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 16.

27

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 3-4.
-7-

billed except the charges for use of dump trucks.

(R. 270)

Accordingly, it entered judgment for $10,990.00, representing
the original billed amount of $30,162.50 less the charges for
use of dump trucks and less the $8,613.00 check already
received from Mountain Bell.

(R. 275-76)

The court further

awarded prejudgment interest, compounded annually from April
15, 1985 to the date of judgment.

(R. 276)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The trial

court erred by failing to make any

findings of fact on Mountain Bell's affirmative d€>fense of
accord

and

satisfaction.

Thus

the

conclusion

of

law

rejecting that defense is unsupported and must be reversed.
Even if findings had been made, however, the weight of the
evidence is clearly contrary to a conclusion that there was
no

accord

and

satisfaction,

because

the

uncontroverted

evidence and admissions on that issue establish the defense
as a matter of law.
2.

The trial judge erred by relying on a prior judge's

denial of Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment on the
accord and satisfaction issue as being the law of the case.
The denial of that motion did not become the law of the case,
and the trial judge's reliance on it prejudiced Mountain Bell
because the standard for granting summary judgment is biased
against the movant, while no such bias should exist in a
trial setting.

Thus Mountain Bell was deprived of a fair

-8-

opportunity to have its defense considered by the trial
judge.
3.
of

law

Mountain Bell is entitled to dismissal as a matter
on

the

satisfaction.

basis

of

its

defense

of

accord

and

Undisputed facts establish that a bona fide

dispute existed between the parties over the unliquidated
amount owing on the contract, that Mountain Bell tendered a
check in a lesser amount to settle the entire dispute, that a
condition was attached to the tender, to the effect that
negotiation of the check would fully satisfy the claim, and
that Estate negotiated the check after receiving notice of
the condition.

The facts that the condition was stated in a

letter sent separately from and later than the check, and
that Estate demanded payment of the remainder claimed to be
due and filed suit before negotiating the check, do not
defeat the accord and satisfaction, because the accord and
satisfaction takes place at the time of negotiation of the
check, not before.

By negotiating the check, Estate accepted

the condition attached thereto.
4.
be

The court erred in allowing pre-judgment interest to

compounded,

because

compounding

statute and is contrary to case law.

-9-

is not

authorized by

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CORRECT STANDARDS OF REVIEW REQUIRE THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
TO REVERSE IF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
FINDINGS OF FACT, IF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS, OR IF THE TRIAL COURT
MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO ESTABLISHED FACTS.
Under well established principles of appellate review,

the findings of the trial court on disputed issues of fact
would be sustained
evidence•

if they were supported by substantial

However, in this case, with respect to the issue

of accord and satisfaction arising from the negotiation of
Mountain

Bell's

check

offered

"in

full

satisfaction

of

contracted services," the court made no findings of fact, but
simply entered the following conclusion of law:
1. Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is
hereby concluded that there was no accord and
satisfaction in that the Order of Judge Michael R.
Murphy delineated the area fully and is the law of
the case. Even if it were not the law of the case,
Exhibit 6 [the letter of June 14, 1985 from
Mountain Bell to Estate] did not fulfill the
requirements of an accord and satisfaction.
In contrast to findings of fact, "[conclusions of law
. . . are simply reviewed on appeal for correctness without
any deference to the trial court."

Cove View Excavating &

Construction Co. v. Flynn, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 (Utah App.
1988); see also. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d
250, 253 (Utah 1985); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985).

Mountain Bell has long maintained that it

is entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law on
the undisputed facts relating to the accord and satisfaction
defense.

Thus, this court may determine whether Mountain
-10-

Bell is entitled to such a dismissal without deferring to the
trial court's contrary view.
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon . . . .

Requests for findings are

not necessary for purposes of review."

The requirement for

findings "is mandatory and may not be waived. . . . Failure
of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error."

Romrell v. Zion's First National Bank,

611 P.2d 392, 394-95 (Utah 1980).

See also Gaddis Investment

Company v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 (1954).28
Not only must the court make findings on the ultimate issue,
but it should also make findings on subsidiary issues of
fact:
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is
essential to the resolution of dispute under the
proper rule of law.
To that end the findings
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.
[citations omitted] The rule as stated
in Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 p. 31, 33
(1928) is:
that until the court has found on all the
material issues raised by the pleadings,
28

Rule 52(a) also provides: "It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court." However, in his oral ruling at the
close of the trial, the trial judge did not state any factual
findings on the accord and satisfaction issue. Transcript of
Jan. 15 at 2-4.
-11-

the findings are insufficient to support
a judgment; and that findings should be
sufficiently distinct and certain as not
to require an investigation or review to
determine what issues are decided,
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979).

Thus

the failure of the trial court to make findings on the accord
and satisfaction issue requires reversal.

The lack of such

findings on the accord and satisfaction issue deprives this
Court of a basis for proper review of the conclusion denying
that defense.
the

It is especially important to have findings on

facts relating to that defense, because all of the

elements

of

the

defense

were

apparently

established

undisputed evidence and by Estate's admissions.
pp. 17-30]

by

[See infra,

It is impossible to challenge non-findings as

being clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence; hence
Mountain Bell is obviously prejudiced by the lack of findings
on that issue.
If this Court concludes that findings on the accord and
satisfaction

issue

are

unnecessary,

or

that

there

are

sufficient findings in the record, or if this Court assumes
that if findings had been made on all factual issues relating
to the accord and satisfaction defense, they would have
supported

the

conclusion

of

law,

then

the

appropriate

standard of review is whether the weight of the evidence is
clearly contrary to the findings, or whether it manifestly
appears that the trial court misapplied the law to the
established facts, or whether the reviewing court reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
-12-

See Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board. 28 Utah 2d 368, 503
P.2d 137 (1972); Cove View Excavating & Construction Co. v.
Flyrm, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6,7 (Utah App. 1988).

With respect

to sufficiency of the evidence, the Utah Supreme Court stated
in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp.. 592 P.2d
620,

626

(Utah 1979):

"[W]hen a finding is so plainly

unreasonable that no trier of the fact could fairly make such
a finding, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial
evidence and the finding will be rejected as a matter of law,
and the fact determined otherwise."

II.

THE DENIAL OF MOUNTAIN BELL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS NOT BINDING ON THE TRIAL COURT, NOR DOES IT
PREVENT THE TRIAL JUDGE FROM EXERCISING INDEPENDENT
JUDGMENT IN DECIDING WHETHER MOUNTAIN BELL WAS ENTITLED
TO THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION;
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS THE LAW OF THE CASE.
The "law of the case" doctrine does not bind a trial

judge to follow the decision of an earlier judge of the same
district in denying a motion for summary judgment.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen a party thinks that his
case is so clear that he should have a summary judgment
without trial and so moves, the denial of that motion settles
that issue and nothing else. That is, that he is not entitled
to the summary judgment."

West v. West. 15 Utah 2d 87, 387

P.2d 686, 689 (1963) (emphasis added).
While an earlier decision of law in a case is typically
followed
question,

to

avoid

the

piecemeal

denial

of

a

litigation
motion

-13-

for

of

an

summary

identical
judgment

presents an entirely different situation, because it does
nothing more than negatively answer the question of whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists.

The Utah Supreme

Court recognized such a distinction in Richardson v. Grand
Central Corp.. 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977), where it stated:
The purpose of the doctrine of 'the law of the case7 is
that in the interest of economy of time and efficiency
of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and
the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and
rulings upon the same proposition in the same case. But
it is also true that generally preliminary or interim
rulings do not rise to the dignity of res judicata or
stare decisis. It is further true that ordinarily one
judge* of the same court cannot properly overrule the
decision of another judge of that court. Notwithstanding
thos€* propositions, the ruling of one judge cis to the
sufficiency or effect of pleadings, does not prevent
another division of the court from considering the same
question of law if it is properly involved on a
subs€jquent motion which presents the case in a different
1ight. Similarly, the denial of a motion for summary
judgment is not binding upon another division of the
court in different circumstances, such as where the
evidence has been presented so a judgment can be formed
with respect thereto.
Id. at 397 (emphasis added).

In Richardson, one judge had

denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, while a
subsequent

judge

granted

the

defendant's

motion

for

a

directed verdict at trial; the Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment.
2d

See also Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 Utah

415, 510 P.2d

1104, 1105

(1973).

The exhibits and

testimony of witnesses introduced at the trial in this case
presented the issue of accord and satisfaction in "different
circumstances"

and

was

not

the

type

of

"repetitious

contention" that the law of the case doctrine was designed to
prevent.

Whether

Mountain

Bell

-14-

was

entitled

to

the

affirmative

defense

of

accord

and

satisfaction

in

this

contract dispute was a question upon which the trial judge
had an obligation to rule independently, based on the trial
evidence

and

admissions

on file.

His deference to the

earlier judge's denial of summary judgment becomes even more
objectionable when the cursory treatment of Mountain Bell's
defense at the close of the trial is examined.

Judge Hanson

did not articulate any reasons for rejecting the accord and
satisfaction defense other than to refer to Judge Murphy's
ruling, which he considered "not merely just a motion for
summary judgment denied," but a ruling that "carries more
weight than merely a minute entry," concluding "I do believe
it is the law of the case."29
The trial

judge failed to distinguish the different

standards under which evidence must be judged on a motion for
summary judgment as opposed to a trial.

On a motion for

summary judgment, a court "must evaluate all the evidence and
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).

In a

non-jury trial, on the other hand, the judge, as trier of the
facts, must

weigh

the

evidence

impartially.

The trial

judge's reliance on the earlier ruling on Mountain Bell's
motion for summary judgment, where the law imposed a bias

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 3.
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against Mountain Bell (the movant), denied Mountain Bell an
opportunity to have its defense weighed neutrally at trial.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO
DISMISS ESTATE'S COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF MOUNTAIN
BELL'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Utah law requires three elements to be established for
an accord and satisfaction defense: (1) an unliquidated claim
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment
tendered in full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an
acceptance, of the payment.
706 P.2d

607

See Marton Remodeling v. Jensen,

(Utah 1985); Masonry Equipment & Supply v.

Willco Associates, Inc.. 755 P.2d

756

(Utah App. 1988).

While accord and satisfaction is simply an application of
general

contract

law, which

requires

competent parties,

offer, acceptance, and consideration to make the agreement
enforceable, see Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d
730 (Utah 1985); Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 87
Utah Adv. Rep. 21,22 (Utah App. 1988); and Brimley v. Gasser,
754 P.2d 97 (Utah App. 1988), the settlement of the dispute
is deemed to be sufficient consideration where the amount in
question

is

unliquidated.

Sugarhouse

Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980).

Finance

Co.

v.

Where the offer

is tendered in the form of a check for less than the amount
claimed, with the condition that negotiation constitutes full
settlement, the mere negotiation of the check constitutes
acceptancer notwithstanding the payee's efforts or intent to
negate

the

condition.

See, e.g.f
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Marton Remodeling v.

Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) (writing "not full payment"
below the condition); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d
774 (Alaska 1983) (sending a letter stating the payment had
been applied to the debt, and reserving the right to seek
further sums); Welbourne & Purdy, Inc. v. Mahon, 388 N.Y.S.2d
369 (Ct. App. 1976) (commencing a lawsuit before negotiating
the check); Braudaway v. United Equitable Insurance Co. , 208
So.2d 359 (La. App. 1968) (payee's attorney writing a letter
rejecting the condition); Cove View Excavating & Construction
Co. v. Flynn, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 1988) (crossing
out the restrictive language on advice of counsel).

See

generally. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Acceptance
of Check Purporting to be Final Settlement of Disputed Amount
Constitutes Accord and Satisfaction, 42 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1985)
and cases collected therein.
Since the trial court did not specify which elements of
the defense it believed Mountain Bell had or had not proved,
it is necessary to review the evidence on each element, to
establish that Mountain Bell was entitled to a dismissal as a
matter of law on the basis of accord and satisfaction.
A.

There was a bona fide dispute between the
parties and the amount in controversy was
unliquidated

There can be no doubt that a bona fide dispute over an
unliquidated amount existed between Estate and Mountain Bell.
The contract between the parties did not specify a total
price; rather, it was essentially a "time and materials"

-17

contract in which only the rates were specified.30

The

amount that would eventually become due for contract services
could not be predicted because it depended on that most
variable of factors, the weather, as well as on the amount of
time spent and the number of removals performed by Estate.
Furthermore,

the

court

found

provisions to be ambiguous.31
challenged

and

must be

the

applicable

contract

That finding has not been

accepted

on

appeal.

An honest

disagreement over the meaning of ambiguous terms must be
assumed to be bona fide. That Mountain Bell's dispute of the
bill for $30,162.50 was bona fide is indicated not only by
the ambiguity of the contract and the variability of the
factors on which the amount owing depended, but also by the
fact that the bill included unauthorized charges of over
$10,000 for the use of dump trucks.

It is no wonder that

Mountain Bell disputed the bill.
There can be no doubt that the dispute related to a
single unliquidated

claim.

There was a single contract

between the parties; there was a single disputed final bill;
and there was a single check sent in response to the bill.
In Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983)
(quoted with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Marton
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985)), the
court

stated:

"The authorities conclude that the entire

30

Exhibit 3 (Appendix D).

31

Transcript of Jan. 15 at 6-10.
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claim, including both its disputed and undisputed elements,
is unitary and not subject to division so long as the whole
claim is unliquidated."

673 P.2d at 778.

The facts in this

case compel a similar conclusion as a matter of law.
B.

Mountain Bell tendered an amount in full
satisfaction of the entire claim of
Estate

The

trial

court's

principal

error

was

in

treating

Estate's claim as being divisible, such that the check for
$8,613.00 could be considered

full payment of undisputed

charges, leaving the disputed charges for further resolution.
That conclusion ignores several critical considerations.

It

ignores the facts that after all the work had been completed,
Estate submitted a single final bill for all of the work it
had done at Alta, and that Mountain Bell responded to that
bill

with

restrictive

a

single
language

check
in

and

the

letter.

letter

that

It

ignores the

the

check

tendered "in full satisfaction of contracted services."

was
It

ignores the further language in the letter warning that: "If
vou are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 in full
satisfaction of the sums due. DO NOT negotiate the check, for
upon your negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter
as fully paid."
as

divisible,

If Mountain Bell had treated Estate's claim
and

had

intended

to

fully

pay

only

the

undisputed portion of the bill, rather than to settle the
whole

claim,

whatsoever.

the

quoted

language

would

make

no

sense

Finally, the trial court's conclusion flies in

the face of the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Marton:
-19-

[W]here we are confronted with a single unliquidated
claim, viz,, the balance owing on a "time and materials"
contract. . . . the general rule applies, which is that
an accord and satisfaction of a single claim is not
avoided merely because the amount paid and accepted is
only that which the debtor concedes to be due or that
his view of the controversy is adopted in making the
settlement.
706

P.2d

at

609.

See

also.

Cove

View

Excavating

&

Construction Co. v. Flynn, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App.
1988).

Thus even if $8,613.00 was the amount that Mountain

Bell conceded was due, the accord and satisfaction is still
effective.
In denying Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment,
Judge Murphy erroneously distinguished the present case from
Marton, whose facts closely resemble the present conflict.
In that case, Marton had billed Jensen $6,538.12 for services
rendered on a "time and materials" contract.

Jensen felt

that the number of hours claimed by Marton Remodeling in its
billing was "excessive." He therefore sent Marton Remodeling
a check for $5,000, representing a certain price-per-hour
amount Jensen felt obligated to pay.

In other words, Jensen

did not dispute that Marton Remodeling had actually performed
some work; he simply accepted some of the total hours claimed
and rejected others.
Here, Mountain Bell similarly was in dispute with Estate
over whether the total number of hours and days claimed to
have been worked were actually worked as required by the
contract.

In support of its contention, Mountain Bell's

letter contained a detailed account of the days it disputed,
-20-

based on a weather report obtained from Alta Peruvian Lodge.
The defendant in Marton probably did not have such a tool for
verification

at his disposal, yet he was still able to

convince the Supreme Court that a bona fide dispute existed
as

to

the

compensate.

number

of

hours

he

should

be

obligated

to

The fact that Mountain Bell took the trouble to

verify its contention with objective data while the defendant
in

Marton

subjectively

labelled

the

hours

claimed

"excessive," should not work to penalize Mountain Bell and
take the facts of this case out of Marton'& reasoning.
In

denying

Mountain

Bell's

accord

and

satisfaction

defense, Judge Murphy relied heavily on two decisions more
than twenty years old where the Supreme Court was unable to
find an accord and satisfaction in factually distinguishable
settings

involving

multiple

claims.

See

Bennett

v.

Robinson's Medical Mart. Inc. . 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761
(1966) and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson. Inc.. 13 Utah 2d 142,
369 P.2d 296 (1962).

In Bennett, the controversy involved

two claims by a salesman against his employer: one for his
fixed monthly salary which was not in dispute and another for
commissions claimed to be owing.

The Court properly held

that by paying the salesman an amount representing his fixed
salary, the company was merely giving the salesman an amount
to which he was unquestionably entitled.

Whether commissions

were due represented the only dispute between the two parties
and for that dispute to be settled, new consideration would
have to be supplied in addition to the original payment.
-21-

See

Suaarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah
1980).
Unlike the plaintiff in Bennett. Estate was not on a
fixed salary with respect to removing snow from Mountain
Bell's Alta office.

The opportunity for work depended on an

occurrence as unpredictable as snowfall accumulation on a
private road, an event to which Estate can hardly claim it
was unquestionably entitled, especially since the charges for
removing snow even on days when snowfall exceeded four inches
were

clearly

unliquidated.

Given this variable, it is

untenable for Estate to argue (much like the unsuccessful
plaintiff in Marton) that it was "unquestionably entitled to
the [$8,613.00] represented by the check, and [that] the only
dispute

was

whether

forthcoming]."
Dillnian

any

further

amount

[should

be

Marton, 706 P.2d at 608.

involved

two

claims

by a dealer against a

manufacturer for merchandise returned to the manufacturer
upon termination of the dealership.
merchandise
liquidated

accepted
and

not

by

the

disputed;

The first claim was for

manufacturer,
the

represented full payment on that claim.

check

which
in

was

question

The second claim was

for other merchandise which the manufacturer rejected, and
for which no payment was made or offered.

The Court held

that the check for the first claim did not create an accord
and satisfaction for the second claim.

Thus Dillman is

distinguishable on its facts from the present case, and the

-22-

trial

court's

reliance

on

it

in

the

present

case

was

misplaced.
To extrapolate the holding in Dillman to artificially
sever a single claim into multiple claims, as the trial court
apparently did in the present case, dilutes the defense of
accord

and

meaningless.

satisfaction

to

the

point

where

it

becomes

Obviously, by paying at least some part of a

larger claim, a defendant will impliedly concede that a part
of the entire amount is due.

The plaintiff will be quick to

agree with his rival that at least the conceded amount is
owing, while continuing to assert that additional amounts
should be forthcoming.

To characterize the whole transaction

as a series of separate claims, however, would place a
defendant in the dubious position of admitting liability as
to the sum tendered, although he merely intended by his
payment

to

settle

characterization

the

entire

would

disputed

discourage

amount.

parties

Such a

from

making

settlements of disputed amounts, since the payor would fear
that a court might view his accord payment as an admission of
liability or partial payment when the payment was offered
merely to avoid further controversy.

The result would be

contrary to the law's policy of encouraging settlement.

See

Marton, 706 P.2d at 610 ("The law favors compromise in order
to limit litigation.

Accord and satisfaction serves this

goal.")
The

facts

in

the

very

recent

case

of

Cove

View

Excavating & Construction Co. v. Flynn. 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6
-23-

(Utah App. 1988) are remarkably similar to the facts in this
case.

In Cove View, the parties had oral agreements for the

rental of defendants backhoe and a water pump to complete
excavation work on a highway project.

In both instances, the

hourly or daily rates were set, but not the total number of
hours or days to be worked.

The plaintiff sent defendant an

invoice for rental of the equipment based on a claimed number
of hours and days of rental.

The defendant disagreed with

the invoice, based on his own time records.

Accordingly, he

sent the plaintiff a check for less than the invoice amount,
with the notation "pmt in full to date labor & materials."
On

the

advice

of

counsel,

plaintiff

crossed

out

the

restrictive language on the check and negotiated it.
The trial court in Cove View denied the defendants
motion for summary judgment and at the trial granted judgment
for the plaintiff on the basis that it was not "fair" for the
defendant to raise a dispute regarding the hours billed by
merely sending the check with restrictive language the court
concluded

had

"no

effect,"

and

because

the

court

characterized the check as payment on an "ongoing account;"
hence the court concluded that the plaintiff had intended to
accept the check as partial payment only.
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for entry of
judgment for the defendant, holding that under the above
facts, th€i negotiating of the check created an accord and
satisfaction,

"notwithstanding

[plaintiff's]

lack

actual intent to accept it as such." This Court held:
-24-

of

any

[Plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known—
from the nature of the rental agreement itself and
from the language on the check — that [defendant]
disputed [plaintiff's] computation of the total
number of hours of equipment rental and was making
an offer of accord and satisfaction.
The trial
court's finding to the contrary is clearly
erroneous.
88 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8.
The

undisputed

facts

in the present

case compel a

similar ruling by this Court that Mountain Bell tendered an
amount in full satisfaction of Estate's entire claim and that
Estate knew or should have known that fact at the time the
check was negotiated.
C.

Estate accepted the tendered payment by
negotiating the check.

It is undisputed that Estate negotiated the $8,613.00
check from Mountain Bell on October 28, 1985, almost three
months after receiving the letter of June 14, 1985 that
communicated

the condition that negotiation of the check

would constitute full settlement.

Estate knew that the check

referred to in the letter was the check for $8,613.00 that it
had received earlier.

Apparently neither Judge Murphy nor

Judge Hanson considered the failure to enclose the check with
the

letter to be fatal to the accord and satisfaction,

because neither mentioned

it as a reason to reject the

defense.
In

its Memorandum

in Opposition

to Mountain

Bell's

Motion for Summary Judgment, Estate claimed that Mountain
Bell cannot retroactively place conditions on its previous
tender of a check (R. 77-79) .
-25-

Such a view of accord and

satisfaction is inconsistent with the principles of contract
law upon which the doctrine is based.
affirmed

the

concept

that

"the

This Court recently

elements

essential

to

contracts generally must be present in a contract of accord
and satisfaction, including offer and acceptance, competent
parties, and consideration.*

Masonry Equipment & Supply v.

Willco Associates, I n c . 755 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah. App. 1988),
citing Golden Key Realty. Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1985).
It is hornbook law that mutual assent can be inferred
from a series of letters, documents and other correspondence
sent between two parties. 1 Corbin on Contracts. § 31 (1952).
Here, however, Estate seems to contend that the time of
receipt of the check was the exclusive moment at which the
minds of the two parties could meet, precluding Mountain Bell
from completing its offer of settlement in a separate, laterreceived

letter.

The

proper

focus

of

accord

and

satisfaction, however, is on the payee's knowledge at the
time of the alleged acceptance, rather than on the sequence
of events leading up to such acceptance.
The moment the creditor indorses and collects the check
with knowledge that it is offered in full satisfaction
of a disputed claim, he thereby agrees to the condition
and is estopped from denying such agreement. It is then
that the minds of the parties meet and the contract of
accord and satisfaction becomes complete.
1 Am.Jur.2d. Accord and Satisfaction, § 18 (1962) (emphasis
added) . This Court similarly held as a matter of law in
Masonry that "the parties reached an accord and satisfaction
-26-

when [the payee1 accepted and cashed the check." 755 P.2d at
758

(emphasis added).

Elevator

Co. , 68 P.2d

See also. Miller v. Prince Street
663, 665

(N.M. 1937)

(cited with

approval in Marton) ("the moment the [creditor] cashed the
check, the minds of the parties met, and they mutually agreed
that it constituted full payment").

Because Estate knew at

the time of indorsement of the check and placement of it in
the bank-collection process that it had been offered in full
satisfaction of the entire disputed amount, it is irrelevant
that receipt of the check preceded receipt of the letter.
Estate claims that it treated the check as a partial
payment

upon

receipt,

thus

defeating

the

later-imposed

condition that negotiation would result in full satisfaction
of the claim.
the facts.

Such a claim is contrary to both the law and
That the check was not treated as a partial

payment is shown not only from the failure to negotiate it
immediately, but from the facts that the payment was never
entered on Estate's ledger and that when Estate filed its
lawsuit, it claimed the full amount of $30,162.50, rather
than the lesser amount of $21,549.50, which it should have
claimed if the "partial payment" had been applied to the
bill.

(R.

2)

Significantly,

Estate

did

not

amend

its

complaint to claim the lesser amount until well after the
check had been negotiated.
In

claiming

that

(R. 24)

receipt

of

the

check

constituted

"partial payment" of the entire account, Estate misconstrues

-27-

Utah law governing negotiable instruments.

Utah Code Ann. §

70A-3-802(l)(b) (1980) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for
an underlying obligation . . . in any other case the
obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument
is due or if it is payable on demand until its
presentment. If the instrument is dishonored action may
be maintained on either the instrument or the
obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on the
instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
(emphasis added)
collection,

the

Thus, until Estate presented the check for
underlying

obligation

was

suspended,

permitting further negotiations and action by Mountain Bell
with respect thereto.

The "unless otherwise agreed" language

that prefcices Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-802 (1) (b) merely serves
to recognize the freedom of parties to enter into an accord
and satisfaction agreement, thus discharging an obligation
where there would otherwise be suspension of the debt.
Brimley v. Gasser. 754 P.2d 97 (Utah App. 1988).

See

Estate does

not allege, nor can it in good faith allege, that the two
parties had "agreed" that transfer of the check would operate
to discharge only part of the obligation.32

In th€> absence

of such an agreement, the entire obligation was suspended
until October 28, 1985, when Estate presented the instrument

32

On the contrary, receipt of the check by itself was
sufficient to put Estate on notice that Mountain Bell
considered the check to discharge the entire underlying
obligation. Estate's bill for $30,162.50 required the total
amount to be paid in a lump sum, with nothing to suggest that
payments were to be made progressively or in installments.
Cf. Keppard v. International Harvester Co.. 581 F.2d 764, 767
(9th Cir. 1978).
-28-

for payment, having full knowledge of Mountain Bell's offer
of accord and the consequences of negotiation of the check.33
The fact that Estate's attorney sent Mountain Bell a
demand letter after receiving the check but before Mountain
Bell's letter was received is of no consequence.

The fact

remains that Estate did not negotiate the check until well
after it had received Mountain Bell's
condition on negotiating the check.

letter

imposing a

Even if Mountain Bell

had formulated its letter and offer of accord after receiving
Estate's attorney's letter (although there is no evidence to
support such a finding), the negotiation of the check would
have created an accord and satisfaction, because it was not
the receipt or retention of the check which triggered the
agreement, but the negotiation of the check.34
At the time Estate received Mountain Bell's letter,
having not yet negotiated the check, it had only two choices:
it could return the check and pursue the full amount of its
33

The immateriality of the sequence in which the check
and its restrictive conditions were received can be
illustrated by the following hypothetical: By mailing the
check, Mountain Bell had issued an order to its bank to make
payment; thus, the check represented merely a promise to pay,
the payment on which Mountain Bell could have stopped at any
time prior to presentment.
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4403(1). Mountain Bell could have then reissued another check
for $8,613.00, accompanied by the restrictive conditions.
The same result was accomplished by simply issuing the
restrictive conditions while the first check was
unnegotiated, and was thus merely a promise to pay.
34

Estate's attorney admitted that the reason the
original complaint prayed for the full amount of $30,162.50
was that at the time the complaint was filed, the check had
not been cashed. Transcript of Jan. 12 at 17.
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claim, or it could cash the check and thereby waive any
further claim.
(i.e.

By seeking to have its cake and eat it too

cashing the check and pursuing the balance of the

claim), Estate ignored the law of accord and satisfaction and
must suffer the consequences.

As stated in Marton, "when a

bona fide dispute arises . . . and a check is tendered in
full payment

of an unliquidated

claim as we have here,

arising out of a 'time and materials' contract, the creditor
may not disregard the condition attached. . . . 'The law gave
the

plaintiffs

the

choice

of

accepting

defendant's terms or of returning it.'"

the

check

on

706 P.2d at 609-10

(quoting from Graff am v. Geronda, 304 A. 2d 76 (Me. 1973))
(emphasis added).

See also Danac, Inc. v. Gudenau & Company.

Inc., 751 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1988).

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ORDERING
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST TO BE COMPOUNDED AGAINST MOUNTAIN
BELL.
The trial court's order for prejudgment interest to be

compounded against Mountain Bell has no basis in statute or
Utah case law.

Neither Utah Code Ann. Section 15-1-1 (legal

rate of interest) nor Utah Code Ann. Section 15-1-4 (judgment
rate of interest), provide any justification for ordering
interest to be compounded.
criticized

a

similar

In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court

trial

court

order

for

compounded

interest, stating:
the court in calculating the amount of the judgment,
compounded the interest annually on the unpaid amounts
-30-

due. This is not proper. Compounded interest is not
favored by law.
Watkins & Faber v. Whitelev. 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979)
(emphasis added), citing Goodwin v. Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co.. 196 Wash. 391, 83 P.2d 231 (1938), and Musser v.
Murphy, 49 Idaho 141, 286 P. 618 (1930).
In

the

contrary,

a

absence
trial

of

a

court

contractual
is

not

agreement

justified

in

to

the

ordering

prejudgment interest to be compounded. See Watkins & Faber.
592 P.2d at 616.

Thus the trial court committed reversible

error by ordering the prejudgment interest in this case to be
compounded.

CONCLUSION
The trial court denied Mountain Bell a fair opportunity
to

have

its

accord

and

satisfaction

defense

evaluated

neutrally when it relied on the prior judge's denial of the
motion for summary judgment as being the law of the case.
The undisputed facts establish every element necessary to
thedefense of accord and satisfaction.

There was a bona fide

dispute over an unliquidated amount owing on a "time and
materials" contract. Mountain Bell tendered a check for less
than the full amount in full satisfaction of the entire
claim, not just as partial payment for undisputed amounts.
At the time Estate negotiated the check, it was clearly on
notice and knew that Mountain Bell intended and imposed a
condition that negotiation of the check would result in full
-31-

settlement.

Yet Estate took the risk of negotiating the

check, which created the accord and satisfaction.
Estate did not wish that result

That

(which is true of every

plaintiff against whom an accord and satisfaction defense
prevails)

is

irrelevant.

On

these

facts,

which

are

undisputed or which represent the great weight of evidence on
the record, Mountain Bell is entitled to a dismissal of
Estate's complaint as a matter of law.

Request for Relief
Mountain

Bell

respectfully

requests

this

Court

to

reverse the judgment entered herein, and to remand to the
District Court with directions to dismiss Estate's complaint
with prejudice.
that

the

directions

In the alternative, Mountain Bell requests

case

be

to

make

remanded
specific

to

the

district

court

with

findings on the accord and

satisfaction issue, and to modify the judgment to eliminate
the compounding of prejudgment interest.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^

day of August, 1988.

THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

Floy<Lsk. Jensen, Attorney
for Appellant

-32-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of August, 1988,
I caused to be mailed four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant to each attorney for Respondent Estate Landscape
& Snow Removal Specialists, Inc., by United States mail,
postage prepaid, at the following addresses:
David D. Loreman, Esq.
5450 Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123

Lowell Summerhays, Esq.
4609 South State
P.O. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Summary Decision Denying Mountain Bell's Motion for
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E.
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F.

Letter of June 14, 1985 from Mountain Bell to
Estate Landscape (Exhibit 6)

G.

Check for $8,613.00 (Exhibit 8)

A.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FILED
F

IN CLERK'S OFFIC
%alt Lake County Utan

Lowell V. Summerhavs - 3154
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Plaintiff
4609 South State Street
P.O. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355
Telephone: (801) 942-8008

APR-11938

David D. Loreman - 4366
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 520033
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152
Telephone: (801) 261-2887

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE' OF UTAH

ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant.

])
])
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
i
;

Civil No.:

]
])

Judge:

C85-5197

Timothy R. Hanson

]

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly before
the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the Plaintiff having been represented by Lowell V. Summerhays and David D.
Loreman, and the Defendant

having been represented

by Floyd

Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been heard, the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made:

1

00C27Q

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that tnere was a contract and that the

parties were governed by the contract.
2.

The Court finds that the work was not substandard.

3.

The Court finds that tne contract was breached by the

Plaintiff's failure to submit monthly balance statements, however, the Court finds that the breach was not material.
4.

The Court finds that the true intent of the parties was

that the Plaintiff was entitled to bill for each four (4) inches
of snow removed; the contract was not clear and is ambiguous.
5.

The Court finds that the Bobcat was a front load and

was within the terms of the contract.

The following

year the

Defendant again agreed to its use at $55.00 per hour.
6.

The Court finds that tne Plaintiff was to get authori-

zation for the use of further equipment, and that the dump truck
was not authorized.
7.

The Court finds that the $10,000.00 limit on the con-

tract was waived by all parties based upon the conduct of all of
the parties.
8.

The Court

finds regarding

the issue of damages that

Defendant has not paid Plaintiff for plowing and the use of the
front loader costs.
9.

The Court finds that the total bill was $30,162.50, and

the amount disputed is $21,549.50.

The Court

finds that the

amount paid by Mt. Bell on the total bill was $8,613.00.

2
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10.

The Court

finds that the following dates and amounts

were not paid by Mt. Bell, and that these amounts do not include
additional sums for the use of dump trucks.
DATE

11.

AMOUNT

1984
1/08/85
1/21/85
1/26/85
2/01/85
2/04/85
2/05/85
2/06/85
2/07/85
2/08/85
2/11 - 12/85
2/13/85
2/15/85
2/18/85
2/20/85
2/22/85
2/23/85
2/25/85
2/27/85
3/02/85
3/06/85
3/07/85
3/10/85
3/15/85
3/16/85
3/18/85
3/20/85
3/25/85

$ 990.00
255.00
255.00
550.00
170.00
510.00
425.00
425.00
510.00
340.00
1,320.ng
1,017.50
170.00
255.00
907.50
170.00
170.00
170.00
170.00
255.00
425.00
170.00
170.00
170.00
255.00
255.00
255.00
255.00

TOTAL:

$ 10,990.00

The Court finds that interest accrued on the amount due

and owing from April 16, 1985, at ten percent (10%) compounded
per annum, until the date this judgment is entered.

Thereafter,

the judgment will run at twelve percent (12%) per annum, at the
maximum legal rate, plus cost, per Rule 54, Utah Code of Civil
Procedures.
3
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is hereby

concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction in that the
Order of Judge Michael R. Murphy delineated the area fully and is
the law of the case.

Even if it were not the law of the case,

Exhibit 6 introduced into evidence did not fulfill the requirements of an accord and satisfaction.
2.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts, this Court

concludes that there was a written contract and the theories of
quantum merit and unjust enrichment do not apply in this case.
3.

The Court also concludes that there were ambiguities in

the contract and as the contract was drafted by Defendant Mt.
States Telephone and Telegraph, that the contract must be construed against the party who drafted it.
•4.

Based upon the Findings of Fact in this case, it is

hereby concluded that Defendant is responsible

for payment on

each increment of four (A) inches, and the time charged for the
Bobcat, and that no dump trucks were allowed based on no prior
written

modifications of the contract

to include

such

dump

trucks, and therefore, all costs relating to those dump trucks
are found not to be part of the contract.
5.

IT

IS THEREFORE CONCLUDED, based

on the

foregoing

Findings of Fact, that Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. had fulfilled their contract to Mt. States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., and that there is a sum due and owing to Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. in the amount
4
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of $10,990.00, plus interest from April 15, 1985, at the rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum, compounded annually, until the date
this judgment is entered.

Thereafter, interest will be calcula-

ted at twelve percent (12%) per annj/n, including costs of court.
DATED this

/

day o/

LA'pAAjL

, 1983.

HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

^fj

March, 1988, I caused to be hand delivered
foregoing

day of
a copy

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

of the
to:

Floyd A. Jensen, Esq,
Mountain States Telephone 4 Telegraph Co.
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant.

JJWMAL

fi.^u*.
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B.

JUDGMENT

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sail Lake County Utah

Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Plaintiff
4609 South State Street
P.O. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355
Telephone: (801) 942-8008

APR - 1 1938
H DlxCn H'r.yfey. Ci^erd Oist. Court/
By -_:

•

Deputy Clerk

David D. Loreman - 4366
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 520033
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152
Telephone: (801) 261-2887

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•^b, a\a nn.^qqq
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

4-v-SS- 3'35 p ^
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No.:

CK5-5197

vs.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Judge:

Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant.

The above-entitled

matter, having

come on regularly

before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the
Plaintiff having been represented by Lowell V. Summerhays and
David D. Loreman and the Defendant having been represented by
Floyd Jensen, and upon

the trial of this matter having

been

heard,

00C27S

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
Based on the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions
of Law, the Court enters judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant in the anount of $10,990,00, plus interest
at the legal pre-judgment rate of ten percent (10%) sinple interest per annum, compounded annually since the due date of April
15, 1985, to the date the judgment is entered.

Thereafter, it

will run at twelve percent (12%) per anj/um at maximum legal rate,
plus costs, per Rule 54 of the Utah C/5de of Civil p rocedure.
J_

DATED this

fifJuil

day/f

L

1988.

mothy R. Hanson

ATTEST
O :f'

H. DIXON HSNOL5Y
By

>Cf^ sl>(-~ -lC

^J<Jff»

HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
March, 1988, I caused to be hand
foregoing

JUDGMENT

2±-

delivered

day of

a copy

of the

to:

Floyd A. Jensen, Esq.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co*
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant.

f)muid/i. fi.^Qp/^x
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C.

SUMMARY DECISION DENYING MOUNTAIN BELL'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

•_»-w 11^ v^u ,nrv o vjrr!V/rr

Salt Lake County Utah

DEC ^9 1986
H. Dixon Hii
/
By
''/44/f..

lark 3rd Dial. Court
\ /y////tu//
///nv
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

SUMMARY DECISION
AND ORDER
CIVIL NO. -e-85=3333T

Plaintiff,

&&?V7?7

vs.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant.

This Summary Decision and Order is for the purpose of apprising
the parties and counsel of the grounds for the court1 s ruling
and accompanying Order,

A more elaborate, extensive and polished

memorandum decision in this case is not necessary and would
serve no useful purpose.
The issue presented is whether, under the undisputed facts
in this case, there was an accord and satisfaction absolving
defendant from all claims of the plaintiff for alleged breaches
of the November 15, 1985 contract for snow removal ("the contract") •
The discovery, defendant's memorandum of law, and Exhibit "C"
thereto indicate that the defendant's refusal to pay the full
amount claimed was premised on its interpretation of Exhibit
"A" to the contract and specifically paragraph D thereof entitled
"Rates and Charges."

It was defendant's position expressed

ESTATE LANDSCAPING V.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE.

PAGE TWO

SUMMARY DECISION

in its letter of June 14, 1985 that it would not pay for snow
removal on the specified dates when weather records indicated
snow accumulations of less than four inches•

No other basis

for disputing the claims exist in the record before this court
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

There is no dispute

that the amounts tendered were in fact owed in accordance with
the terms of the contract.
This case is controlled by Marton Remodeling v. Jensen,
706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985).

In applying Marton Remodeling to

the case at bar it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's
original assertions constituted a single claim.

In resolving

this matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a single
dispute in determining whether the purported accord and satisfaction
extinguished all of plaintiff's claims.

Generally, the court

would be reluctant to suggest that more than one claim exists
in circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written
contract. This case, however, is controlled by contrary precedent.
The Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling set forth two examples
of circumstances where the dispute involved more than one claim.
It did so by citing with approval its decisions in Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966),
and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc>. 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d
296 (1962).
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SUMMARY DECISION

In Dillman the parties entered into a contract for the
termination of a dealership which included a provision whereby
the defendant was to purchase unused parts.

Defendant sorted

through the parts, accepted some, returned others, and tendered
a check for only the parts accepted.

The Court held that the

cashing of the checks did not constitute an accord and satisfaction
as to those parts rejected and returned to plaintiff.

Whereas

the Court in Dillman may have placed some reliance on the language
of the purported release as being consistent with its ruling,
the Court in Marton Remodeling expressly distingusihed Dillman
as a case which "involved two claims."

706 P.2d at 609.

This court cannot distinguish Dillman from the instant
case.

Much like the defendant in Dillman, the defendant here

accepted some claims and rejected others.

As in Dillman, there

appears to be no dispute as to those claims paid.
Dillman:

To paraphrase

"The dispute was not as to the amount found due for

[the services paid] but as to whether [defendant] breached its
contract by refusing to [pay for all services rendered]."
P.2d at 298.

369

As in Dillman. the services paid for by defendant

were a liquidated amount for snow removal on the occasions when
there was no contract dispute concerning accumulation.

The

doctrine of accord and satisfaction generally applies only to
unliquidated claims. See, Calamari & Perillo, Contracts, Sections
4-10 to -12 (2d Ed. 1977).

000129
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SUMMARY DECISION

Whereas there are other factors not referenced in this
Summary Decision and Order supporting denial of summary judgment
(e.g., intent, consideration, date of acceptance of payment,
and the reasonable expectations of the parties) , the Dillman
case, in light of its interpretation and approval in Marton
Remodeling, alone requires denial of defendant's Motion.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied.
Dated this

29th

day of December; 1986.

rrrwAtfT. R.
p. MURPHY
MTTPPHV
MICHAEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

f

ATTEST

G00130
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SUMMARY DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Summary Decision and Order, postage prepaid,
to the following, this &'?

day of December, 1986:

James W. Carter
Attorney for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Floyd A. Jensen
Attorney for Defendant
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CONTRACT (EXHIBIT 3)

LETTER AGREEMENT
(SNOW REMOVAL - INSURANCE WAIVED)
November 15

. 1984

Room 212
Phoenix, AZ

85014

It is agreed that the undersigned will provide services, in a good and
workmanlike manner for all work hereinafter described. Such services shall
commence under this Agreement on
December 1
, 1984
, and continue
through and Including
November 31
1985 . Thereafter, either
of us may terminate this agreement on thirty (30) days written notice to the
other.
In doing this work, the undersigned will act as an independent contractor
throughout, and although the work will have to be completed to your
satisfaction, the actual details of the work will be under the control of the
undersigned. The undersigned shall also comply, at the expense of the
undersigned, with applicable provisions of workmen's compensation laws,
unemployment compensation laws, federal social security law, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and all other applicable federal, state and local laws and
regulations relating to terms and conditions of employment required to be
fulfilled by employers.
The work shall be done to your satisfaction and in accordance with your
specifications, as applicable. The undersigned will obtain and pay for all
licenses and permits required by law with respect to any work covered by this
Agreement.
If the work hereunder is not performed to your satisfaction, the undersigned
agrees that, upon receiving verbal notice from you, the undersigned will
remedy and deficiencies of which you give notice within five (5) working days
and, if such deficiency is not remedied, agrees that you may deduct from any
monies due the undersigned any amounts necessary to correct the deficiencies.
Further, you may also terminate this Agreement, immediately.
The undersigned will not subcontract any work nor assign any interests under
this Agreement without your prior written consent. You may assign this
agreement at anytime and the undersigned agrees that you will have no further
liability hereunder after such assignment.
The undersigned hereby assumes full responsibility for and shall indemnify and
save you harmless from all claims, losses, liens, expenses, suits and
attorneys 1 fees for injuries to or death of any person and for damages to
any property, including but not limited to, damages to your property and
injury to or death of your agents, or employees, which may in any way arise
out of the performance of or failure to perform the work contemplated-herein,
except to the extent such injury, damage or death is caused by the negligence
of you, your agents or employees.
Page 1 of 2
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In view of the extent of the work hereunder and the nature of the business o "
the undersigned, it is the understanding of the undersigned that ycu will not
require the undersigned to take out and maintain workmen's compensation,
general liability insurance, and automobile liability insurance. However, at
your request, the undersigned, at the expense of the undersigned will take* out
and maintain insurance as you may require should the extent of the work be
modified or the nature of the undersigned's business change. The undersigneo
shall advise you of any change or modification in the number of emplo>ees, if
any, employed by the undersigned.
Unless exempt under the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Lafcor ox
other proper authority, this Agreement is subject to applicable laws and
executive orders relating to Equal Opportunity and nondiscrimination in
employment. The parties hereto shall not discriminate in their employment
practices against any person by reason of race, religion, color, sex or
national origin and agree to comply with the provisions of said laws and
orders, as well as all laws and orders relating to the employment of the
handicapped, the employment of veterans and the use of minority businass
enterprises, to the extent any such laws and orders are applicable in the
performance of the work or furnishing of services, materials or supplies
hereunder. For this purpose, the provisions of such laws £nd orders and
pertinent regulations issued thereunder, as now enforced or hereafter amended,
shall be deemed an Integral part of this Agreement to the same extent as if
written at length herein.
The work shall be performed at the following location(s) and within tie
following hours as described in Exhibit A and Exhibit 8 attached hereto amd
incorporated herein by reference.
The undersigned shall furnish all equipment, materials, and supplies, for the
use of the undersigned in the performance of the work under this Agreement.
Payment shall be made by you to the undersigned within thirty (30) days after
receipt of proper billing invoices with supporting documentation, if
appropriate, from the undersigned, in accordance with the scale set forth in
Exhibit A, for all work completed under this Agreement through the last day of
the preceding month.
If the Agreement expressed herein meets with your approval and assent, please
indicate your acceptance of the Agreement in the space provided below for that
purpose and return said copy to the undersigned.
Estate Landscape & Maintenance
CONTRACTOR

'—N

^

By ^ . . A ^ X r l ^ v ^
Title G ( i f t c g x \
Address:

THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

By

/'//(<

(t /> Jf, '•

Title

Hanaqer Reoorts Center

< f r y , C N C Q A te

3089 Little Cottonwood Rd.
Sandy, Utah 84070

Data

1

i ' ) A)

T^tK AGREEMENI-4EG0TIATEC/BID

ltle
Page 2 of 2

Assistant Manager
Contract Adm.
0102c 6/82

EXHIBIT A
Description of work: To provide all labor, materials &
incidentals necessary to: Maintain a snow-free condition on
all parking lots including loading dock areas and stairwells
as applicable, whenever the snow reaches 2" or as requested
by Mountain Bell Real Estate Personel.
Location of work:

C.

673050
673079
674171
674269
673140
674104

Salt Lake ESS 500 S. Wasatch
Cottonwood ESS 3480 Danish
Riverton ESS 2690 W. 126000 S
Draper EQ 11351 S. 100 E.
Alst Main Alta Canyon
4282 W. 1730 S.

Time Limits for performance of work:
The work performed should be completed on Sunday thru
Saturday prior to 6:00 a.m. or when the accumalation is 2'
or more.
Rates and Charges:
674104
673050
674171
673079
674269
673140

4282 W. 1730 S.
500 S. Wasatch
12600 S. 2690 W.
3480 Danish
11351 S.100 E.
Alta Main *

$140.00 per removal
$40.00
per removal
$35.00 per removal
$60.00 per removal
$60.00 per removal
$85.00 per removal at 4"

The contract amount shall not exceed $10,000.00 during the contract
period. Price includes all sales tax.
Definition of when each labor rate applies:
Snow Plowing

The snow shall be plowed at Alta Main (673140)
when the snow reaches 4 inches. The cost is to
be $85.00 per removal or $55.0Q for the front
end loader and operator as required. This price
includes all sales tax.
The snow is not to be plowed down Co the black
top at Alta Main in Alta Canyon.

Snow Hauling:
E.

N/A

Material Charges:

Salt

The rate per application of salt for the small locations
shall be $30.00. The rate for Alta Main is $50.00 per
application
F.

Other charges and when applicaple, (if any):
N/A

EXHIBIT B
SNOW REMOVAL SPECIFICATIONS

GENERAL
Contractor shall perform it's services hereunder (a) in strict
compliance with all applicable State, County, Municipal, and
administrative laws, ordinances, rules and regulations including
those pertaining to environmental protection and sarety, (b) in
a worlananlike manner and (c) to the satisfaction of the Company,
Contractor will provide all labor, transportation, tools, implements,
appliances, materials, supplies, and insurance required to perform
the services herein described,
SCOPE OF WORK
Contractor will clear snow and ice from the following areas as
they may apply and before 6:00 A.M., unless otherwise specified:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Sidewalk
Steps
Driveway
Parking areas

The service is to be performed when more than two (2) inches of
snow has accumulated on the site or as directed by the authorised
Mountain Bell representative.
OTHER SERVICES
In addition to basic snow removal, the Company may also request
Contractor to provide incidental or special services from time to
time on an hourly rate, piece rate, or lump sum basis as mutually
agreed to by the parties. Such services shall be subject to the
terms and conditions of the agreement. Such incidental or special
services shall be covered per written instructions containing a
description of the services to be furnished and specifying location,
time, completion date(s), rates and/or charges, and any other significant conditions for the performance of the service.
CONTRACTOR SUPERVISION
Contractor shall designate a representative who shall, during all
times that any of Contractor's employees are performing services
on Company premises, be available by telephone and responsible for
the proper performance of Contractors employees of the services
hereunder. Contractor shall provide sufficient supervision of said
employees and the services performed to assure results satisfactory
to the Company.

1

BILLING AND PAYMENTS
At the end of each of Contractor1! billing periods, in which ejch
period shall not exceed one (1) month, Contractor shall render to
the Company a bill for the amount owed to Contractor for services
rendered during that period. Each bill shall be computed on the
basis of the rates and/or charges agreed upon in the Agreement
and shall be delivered to the Company at such address the Company
may designate. Each such bill shall be paid by the Company within
thirty (30) days after receipt. Such payments shall constitute
full compensation to Contractor for performance of said services
including Contractor's direct costs, overhead, and other indirect
costs and profits.
TERMINATION
(a) Company may terminate the Agreement and/or cancel any written
instructions executed hereunder by giving Contractor seventy-two
(72) hours prior written notice. If such termination and/or
cancellation is for reasons other than Contractor's failure to
comply with the terms of the Agreement or any associated written
instructions, the Company shall pay Contractor for services
performed up to the date Contractor receives Company's notice, an
amount computed on the basis of the rates, or a proration of the
sums, specified in the Agreement(s) authorizing such services. If
such termination and/or cancellation is due to failure of Contractor
to comply with the terms of the Agreement or any associated written
instructions, Company shall pay Contractor for services performed
to the Company's satisfaction, an amount agreeable to Company and
predicated upon the rates, or a proration of th^ sums, specified
in the written instructions authorizing such services.
(b) Except for claims for payments provided for in paragraph VI(a)
above, if the Agreement and/or any associated written instructions
are terminated or cancelled pursuant to paragraph VI(a), Contractor
agrees to waive and does hereby waive all claims against Company
for profits, loss or damage because of such termination or cancellation.
HOLIDAYS

Scheduled s e r v i c e s that f a l l on h o l i d a y s observed by Company (New
Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day,
Labor Day, Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day) may
be omitted u n l e s s otherwise s p e c i f i e d .
SECURITY
(a) At Company's request, Contractor shall promptly remove from
Company's premises any employee of Contractor who in Company's
opinion has been negligent, dishonest or otherwise unsatisfactory
in performing his or her duties hereunder. However, a request for
such removal shall in no way be interpreted to require dismissal
or other disciplinary action of the employee by Contractor.
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SECURITY (cont'd)
(b) Contractor shall report to Company promptly any> hazardous or
unusual condition existing on premises of Company. The Company
may require Contractor1s employees to wear Company-supplied identification badges while on Company premises. Contractor agrees
that it shall not duplicate any Company keys, and it shall return
all Company keys and identification badges to the Company Representative immediately upon termination of this agreement. If the
Contractor fails to return such keys and badges within five (5)
days after termination, Company may withhold any payment due
Contractor until all such property is returned, and Contractor
agrees that it shall be responsible for, and shall indemnify the
Company against, all damages, costs and expenses resulting from
the loss or destruction of any such keys including, but not limited
to, expenses incurred by the Company in reordering locks and reissuing keys,
(c) In the event of theft or loss of property attributable to the
Contractor, his employees, subcontractors or invitees, the Contractor agrees to replace the property and/or reimburse the Company
the replacement value of the item.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Contractor hereby declares and agrees that Contractor is engaged in
an independent business and will perform it's obligations hereunder
as an independent contractor and not as the agent, employee or
servant of Company; that Contractor has and hereby retains the right
to exercise full control of and supervision over the performance of
Contractor's obligations hereunder and full control over the employment, direction, compensation, and discharge of all employees
assisting in the performance of such obligations; that Contractor
will be solely responsible for all matters relating to payment of
such employees, including compliance with social security, withholding and all other regulations governing such matters; and that
Contractor will be responsible for Contractor1 s own acts and those
of Contractor's subordinates, employees, agents, and subcontractors
during the performance of Contractor's obligations hereunder.
Contractor shall not employ to perform services hereunder any person
who is a full or part-time employee of the Company.
INDEMNITY
(a) Contractor shall indemnify Company and its officers, agents,
and employees, and each of them against, and shall hold them, and
each of them, harmless of and from:
(1) Any loss, cost, damage, claim, expense, or liabilit7 by
reason of injury to or death of any person or damage to
or destruction or loss of any property arising out of,
as a result of, or in connection with the performance of
this Agreement and directly or indirectly caused, in
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INDEMNITY (cont'd)
whole or in part, by or claimed to have been caused by
any act or omission, negligent or therwise, of Contractor
or Contractor's agents or employees regardless of the
negligence of Company or its agents, or employees, be it
active or passive, except where such loss, cost, damage,
claim, expense, or liability arises from the sole
negligence or willful misconduct of Company, its oficers,
agents, or employees, or is caused by the sole negligence
or willful misconduct or Company's independent contractor
(other than Contractor) who, at the time of such loss,
cost, damage, claim, expense or liability was directly
responsible to Company. As used in the preceding
sentence, the words "any person" shall include, but shall
not be limited to, a subcontractor or an agent of Company
or Contractor and an employee of Company, Contractor or
any such subcontractor or agent; and the words "any
property" shall include, but shall not be limited to,
property of the Company, Contractor or any such subcontractor or agent, or an employee of any of them; and
(2) Any and all penalties imposed on account of the violation of
any law, ordinance, order, rule, regulation, condition, or
requirement in any way related, directly c^r indirectly, to
Contractor's performance hereunder, compliance with which
is left by Agreement to the part of Contractor.
LIENS/ENCUMBRANCES
Contractor shall not permit liens or encumbrances to be filed against
Company property by reason of Contractor's (or its subcontractors)
failure to pay for labor performed or materials furnished hereunder;
shall cause any such lien or encumbrance which may be filed to be
released and discharged or record forthwith; and shall hold Company
harmless from any such lien or encumbrance. Company may, if it deems
it necessary, cause any such lien or encumbrance to be released; and
Contractor shall reimburse Company for all costs incurred on that
account, or Company may reimburse itself therefor from funds otherwise due Contractor hereunder.
WAIVERS, AMENDMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS
No provision of the Agreement shall be deemed waived, amended or
modified by either party, unless such waiver, amendment or modification
be in writing signed by the authorized representative of the party
against whom it is sought to enforce such waiver, amendment or modification. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "authorized
representative" shall mean only the person executing the Agreement or
that person's respective successor or superior, if any.
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XIII.

ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT
In the event of a large snow storm, th« rental of additional equipment is necessary to service Company's account, Contractor aust
first obtain the approval of the Field Porce Assistant Manager.
After rental of additional equipment, Contractor shall submit a
copy of invoice for rental charges with monthly bill for snow
removal to Company for payment. It shall be Contractors responsibility to pay for the additional equipment at the time of rental.

XIV.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF CONTRACTS FOR RECORDS
Contractor shall maintain complete, legible, and accurate records
of all services and products charged to Company and costs incurred
in the performance of this Agreement for three (3) years from the
date of termination or cancellation. Company shall have the right,
through its designated representatives, to examine and audit at
all reasonable times and places, all such records and other records
and accounts as may, under recognized accounting practices, contain
information bearing upon amount payable to Contractor hereunder.
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E s t a t e L a n d s c a p e and Snow Remova 1
3089 L i t t l e Cottonwood Road
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1 Im/nlii",
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\\\

i II i I n - 1 ) 4 / 0 1 / 8 5 I n v o i c e

Date

Hear M i .
r h e i: e c e n t i n v o i c e s s u brai 11 e d t o o t i r o £" £ J c e w I I: h r e g a r d t o c o n t r a c t e d

Snow Removal Services at Alta Main, Aita, Utah during the period,
12/28/84 - 04/01/85 have been reviewed along with the daily weather
r e c o r d s s u p p 1 i ed b y * * A 1 1 a P e r i i v I a n I ,o d g e" *. B a s ed < :i i; i a i: e v i e w o f y o t 11:
invoice dates and comparing them w i t h the reports provided by the A i t a
Peruvian Lodge regarding snow accumulation, w e d i s p u t e the following
dates and amounts aa not meeting the contracted for Rates and Charges
and the definition tut Ii m Ltlating snow p] owing. (Snow accumu 1 a til on less
then 4 inches).
12/28/84 th01/08/85
01/2L/85
01/26/85
02/01/85
02/04/85
02/05/85
02/06/85
02/07/85
02/08/85
02/11/85 c
02/13/85
02/15/85
02/18/85
02/20/85
02/22/85
02/23/85
02/25/85
02/26/85
03/02/85
03/06/85
03/07/85
03/10/85
03/14/85
03/16/85
03/18/85
03/20/85
03/25/85

11/hi

1 Inch - 3 Inches
3 Inches
Trace
No Snow
No Snow
3 Inches
No Snow
3 Inches
3 Inches
1 Inch
I Inch
3 Inches
No Snow
No Snow
3 Indies
Trace
3 Inches
I Inch
3 Inches
Trace
No Snow
2 Inches
I Inch
No Snow
No Snow
Trace
No Snow
No Snow

$3960.00
255.00
255.00
1650.00
170.00
510.00
425.00
425.00
510.00
340.00
3960.00
3052.50
170.00
255.00
2722.50
170.00
170.00
17 0.00
17 0.00
255.00
425.00
170.00
170.00
170.00
170.00
255.00
255.00
255.00
$21549.50

Based on the above identified billing descrepencles we have enclosed a
check for $8613.00 which is payment in full for satisfaction of contracted
services. If you are not willing to accept that sumt $8613.00 In full
satisfaction of the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as fully paid.
If there are any questions related to the above, feel free to contact me
on (1-602) 235-3993.
Sincerely,
Emerson Smith
Assistant Manager
Real Estate Operations/CP
cc:

K.L. Uardcastle
Stacy Jones
Dee Myren
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